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The 2016 Referendum, Brexit and the Left Behind:  
An Aggregate-Level Analysis of the Result 
 






Why did the country vote for Brexit? What was the relative importance of factors such as 
education, age, immigration, and ethnic diversity? And to what extent did the pattern of 
support for Brexit across the country map on to past campaigns by Eurosceptic parties, such 
as Ukip? In this article we draw on aggregate-level data to conduct an initial exploration of 
the vote. First, we find that turnout was generally higher in more pro-leave areas. Second, we 
find that public support for Leave closely mapped past support for Ukip. And third, we find 
that support for Leave was more polarized along education lines than support for Ukip ever 
was. The implication of this finding is that support for Euroscepticism has both widened and 







Writing in the aftermath of %ULWDLQ¶VILUVWUHIHrendum on its membership of the then-European 
Community, held on June 5 1975, David Butler and Uwe Kitzinger observed how that earlier 
vote was of interest for mainly three reasons. First, it had delivered an unambiguous public 
endorsemHQWRI%ULWDLQ¶VFRQWLQXHGSDUWLFLSDWLRQLQWKH&RPPRQ0DUNHW:LWKSHUFHQWRI
voters opting to stay in the European Community the public had returned a level of support 
that was µEH\RQGWKHGUHDPVRISUR-(XURSHDQV¶ Second, for observers of party politics at the 
time the vote also represented an historical episode of peculiar fascination, cutting across 
established patterns of party competition, in particular with regard to the Labour Party that had 
seen the referendum crystallize and exacerbate internal ideological conflicts. Third, the vote 
was a distinct innovation in British constitutional practice, being the first nationwide 
UHIHUHQGXPLQWKHFRXQWU\¶VHQWLUHKLVWRU\.i  
Forty-one years later, on June 23 2016, Britain held a second referendum on its 
relationship with Europe and one that impacted directly on all three of these areas, albeit in 
profoundly different ways. If the result of the referendum in 1975 had delivered a level of 
public support for the pro-Europeans that had been beyond their dreams then the result that 
arrived forty-one years later realized their nightmares. When all votes had been counted 51.9 
percent of the electorate had voted to leave the European Union and 48.1 percent had opted to 
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remain. Leave won the vote in the United Kingdom by 3.8 percentage votes but its lead was 
even more striking in England, where it extended to nearly 7 points. Leave also won the popular 
vote in Wales, securing 52.5 percent and only one month after the insurgent UK Independence 
Party (Ukip) had won its first (seven) seats on the devolved Welsh Assembly. Only in Scotland, 
Northern Ireland and London did the Leave vote fail to surpass 50 percent. The result sent 
shockwaves around the world, wiping more than three trillion dollars off the value of financial 
markets in only a few days and prompting Eurosceptic parties in at least seven other member 
states to demand VLPLODUµ%ULWLVK-VW\OH¶UHIHUHQGXPV 
As in 1975, the outcome of the 2016 referendum also shed light on tensions that had 
long been evident within domestic party politics. In the aftermath of a defeat that had been 
partly engineered by the Eurosceptic tradition within his own party, David Cameron, the 
Conservative Prime Minister since 2010, promptly resigned. The act triggered a leadership 
election that would not only determine the next Prime Minister but also push the centre-right 
party ±and the country- down a more overtly Eurosceptic path. The Labour Party, meanwhile, 
which had officially campaigned to remain in the EU, descended into turmoil as Jeremy 
Corbyn, its newly-elected but unpopular leader, faced immediate pressure to also resign. 
Labour MPs argued that Corbyn had failed to demonstrate leadership and communicate a 
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compelling case for why Britain should remain in the EU, claims that were supported by polling 
data released only weeks before the referendum and which suggested that nearly one in two 
Labour voters were unaware that Labour was advocating a Remain position.ii Amid the new 
landscape the only unified parties appeared to be the pro-EU Liberal Democrats, who quickly 
pledged to campaign at the next general election for Britain to re-join the EU, the insurgent 
Ukip that twenty-three years after its formation had achieved its defining goal of withdrawal 
from the EU, and the Scottish National Party (SNP), which argued that the result revealed the 
need for a second independence referendum in Scotland.  
Lastly, and as reflected in the positioning of the SNP, while the 1975 vote attracted 
interest because of its constitutional innovation the referendum result in 2016 posed a direct 
and far more profound challenge to the British constitutional settlement. In the first instance 
the result required parliament to sustain a pro-Brexit policy that was opposed by most MPs, 
which as Vernon Bogdanor has observed is an event without precedent in British history.iii 
While it has been estimated that 421 of the 574 constituencies in England and Wales voted to 
leave the European Union, we calculate that only 148 MPs in England and Wales voted the 
same way.iv Meanwhile, that Northern Ireland and Scotland voted to remain in the EU as 
England and Wales voted to Leave has not only revived calls for Scottish independence but 
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sparked new concerns about how the border between Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic 
will be managed.  
These introductory observations underscore the need to make sense of Brexit and 
explain the 2016 referendum result. In this article we draw on aggregate-level data to conduct 
an initial exploration of the vote and identify areas that future individual-level research will 
want to explore in greater depth. Why did the country vote for Brexit? What was the relative 
importance of factors such as social class, age, immigration, and ethnic diversity? And to what 
extent did the pattern of support for Brexit across the country map on to past campaigns by 
Eurosceptic parties, such as Ukip? While attempting to shed light on the possible answers to 
these questions we will also reflect on what the result reveals about broader fault lines that run 
through contemporary British politics and society.  
 
Brexit Britain: An overview of the results 
 
The result of the 2016 referendum revealed a society which had on the issues of EU 
membership and immigration become divided by social class, generation and geography. The 
Leave campaign, which in the final weeks focused heavily on immigration, received its 
strongest support in the West Midlands (59.3 per cent), a historic bastion of Eurosceptic and 
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anti-immigration sentiment, followed by the East Midlands (58.8 per cent), the North East (58 
per cent), Yorkshire and the Humber (57.7 per cent) and Eastern England (56.5 per cent). The 
Leave campaign attracted its weakest support in Scotland (38 per cent), London (40.1 per cent) 
and Northern Ireland (44.2 per cent). Leave surpassed 70 per cent of the vote in 14 local 
authorities, many of which had at previous elections been targeted by Ukip at local, European 
and general elections. In descending rank order authorities that delivered the strongest Leave 
vote were Boston, South Holland, Castle Point, Thurrock, Great Yarmouth, Fenland, 
Mansfield, Bolsover, East Lindsey and North East Lincolnshire. Leave also polled strongly in 
a large number of northern and often Labour-held authorities, recruiting at least 65 per cent of 
the vote in Hartlepool, Redcar and Cleveland, Middlesbrough, Blackpool, Burnley, Stoke-on-
Trent, Walsall, Doncaster, Barnsley and Rotherham, and also traditionally Labour-held areas 
in parts of Wales, such as Blaenau Gwent and Merthyr Tydfil. At the constituency level it has 
been estimated that while three-quarters of Conservative-held constituencies voted to Leave 
the EU seven in ten Labour-held seats voted the same way.v  
Such areas reveal how Leave won its strongest support in specific types of areas; 
communities that tend to be more economically disadvantaged than average, where average 
levels of education are low and the local population is heavily white. Such areas contrast very 
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sharply with those that gave Remain its strongest support. Aside from Gibralter, where 95.9 
per cent voted Remain, the vote to remain in the EU was strongest in the London authority of 
Lambeth, followed by Hackney, Foyle in Northern Ireland, Haringey, the City of London, 
Islington, Wandsworth, Camden, Edinburgh and then East Renfrewshire in Scotland, and the 
young and affluent city of Cambridge. Of the 50 local authorities where the Remain vote was 
strongest 39 were in London or Scotland. 
These results point clearly toward the importance of deeper divides in British society. 
In this respect one useful starting point for interpreting the result is earlier research on the bases 
of support for Ukip and Euroscepticism in Britain. In Revolt on the Right, Robert Ford and 
Matthew Goodwin demonstrated KRZFKDQJHVWR%ULWDLQ¶VHFRQRPLFDQGVRFLDOVWUXFWXUHhad 
pushed tR WKH PDUJLQV D FODVV RI µOHIW EHKLQG¶ YRWHUV ± older, working-class, white voters, 
citizens with few qualifications, who live on low incomes and lack the skills that are required 
to adapt and prosper amid the modern, post-industrial economy.vi But this research also 
emphasized the importance of long-term generational change in the values that shape the 
outlook of voters toward a range of social and cultural issues, including but not limited to 
immigration, national identity and EU membership. These generational differences in values 
were also exacerbated by changes in party competition, including how the established parties 
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had shifted toward a µOLEHUDOFRQVHQVXV¶ on EU membership and immigration, which fueled 
this underlying value conflict.vii Whereas political and media elites broadly shared values that 
translated into support for social liberalism, multiculturalism and EU membership, left behind 
working-class voters and older social conservatives were united by an altogether different set 
of values that translated into support for a more authoritarian and nativist response. 
Building on this research we will now examine the results of the 2016 referendum in 
more-GHSWK H[SORULQJ ZKHWKHU DXWKRULWLHV ZLWK KLJK FRQFHQWUDWLRQV RI µOHIW EHKLQG¶ JURXps 
were also more likely to vote to leave the EU. In doing so we seek to answer two questions. 
Do the results of %ULWDLQ¶Vreferendum suggest a hardening of the lines between the µhaves 
and the have-nots¶ that in earlier years had underpinned the rise RI8NLS"2UKDV%ULWDLQ¶V 
Eurosceptic movement broadened its social appeal, making these lines of conflict between 
different social groups less distinctive? To examine the extent to which these factors are 
associated with the Leave vote we draw on local authority data from 380 out of the 382 
counting regions in the United Kingdom and link this to census data from 2011 (we exclude 
the counting regions of Gibraltar and Northern Ireland for which we lack comparable data on 
some variables). Clearly, as our analysis is based on aggregate data we need to be cautious 
about drawing inferences about the attitudes and voting behaviour of individuals. Nonetheless, 
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these data still provide a useful snapshot about the kinds of factors that might have influenced 
the overall outcome and, ultimately, led to Brexit. 
 
Turnout 
We can start by considering turnout. At 72 percent the overall level of turnout was the highest 
recorded in a nationwide vote for many years ± and was the highest since the general election 
of 1992. Over 33 million votes were cast across the country, making the 2016 referendum one 
of the largest exercises in democratic decision making that Britain has ever seen. Yet turnout 
was not even across the country. Throughout the campaign Remain organizers had devoted 
significant attention to targeting urban, more densely-populated, younger, more diverse and 
typically more affluent cities, including London and the university towns. However, in the 
shadow of the results it became clear that turnout in cities such as Glasgow, Manchester, 
Nottingham, Birmingham, Liverpool, Leicester and authorities in London such as Newham, 
Hackney, Lewisham, Barking and Dagenham and Camden was at least six points below the 
national average. Of the 50 areas that recorded the lowest turnout exactly half were in London 
or Scotland. The level of turnout across all authorities in London was 70 per cent, 2 points 
below the average. Turnout tended to be high in authorities that had also given above average 
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support to Ukip at the 2014 European Parliament elections, such as the south eastern areas of 
Chiltern, East Hampshire, Horsham, Sevenoaks and Wealdon. Turnout was also noticeably 
high in authorities that have a large population of pensioners, such as East Dorset, the 
Derbyshire Dales, South Lakeland and South Hams, and where there is a large proportion of 
people with qualifications, such as Richmond upon Thames, St Albans, Winchester and South 
Cambridgeshire.  
Table 1 presents the results of a multivariate analysis of turnout. Across the country 
turnout was higher in predominantly white areas where Ukip had polled strongly in the past 
and where there were large numbers of pensioners. Turnout was also higher in areas where it 
had also been high in the European Parliament elections (which itself may have signaled a 
protest vote against Europe). Overall then, high turnout might have helped the Leave vote, as 
turnout was generally higher in more pro-leave areas. However, we should treat these results 
with caution as it does not necessarily follow that it was Leave voters who were 
disproportionately more likely to turnout and vote. There could also hDYHEHHQD µFRXQWHU-
PRELOL]DWLRQ HIIHFW¶ ZKHUHE\ 5HPDLQ VXSSRUWHUV ZHUH PRUH OLNHO\ WR YRWH ZKHQ WKH\ ZHUH
motivated by the awareness that Leave was popular in their local area 
 
Table 1  Multivariate Analysis of Turnout, linear regression 
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 Coefficient Std. Err. 
% Age 65 and over 0.23*** 0.05 
% with no qualifications -0.51*** 0.03 
% non-white -0.16*** 0.02 
Ukip vote in 2014 EU elections 0.17*** 0.02 
Turnout in 2014 EU elections 0.41*** 0.04 
London -0.45 0.64 
Scotland -0.49 0.72 
Constant 62.91*** 1.83 
N 380  
Adjusted R-square 0.79  




Public Support for Brexit 
We now turn our attention to analyzing the result. We start by considering the relationship 
between education and Euroscepticism. While numerous studies have shown that the less well 
educated are consistently more skeptical about European integration it has also been argued 
that the gap in attitudes towards the EU between the lower and higher educated has widened 
over time.viii Figure 1 shows the association between the percentage of people within an 
authority who have no educational qualifications and the percentage who voted to leave the 
EU, and the association between the percentage of people with high educational qualifications 
(of degree level or above) and who voted to leave. To a certain extent the two graphs mirror 
each other. The Leave vote was much higher in authorities where there are substantial numbers 
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of people who do not hold any qualifications while the Leave vote was much lower in areas 
that have a larger number of highly educated people. ,QIDFWRIWKHµOHDVWHGXFDWHG¶DUHDV
YRWHGWROHDYHWKH(8ZKLOHHYHU\VLQJOHRQHRIWKHµPRVWHGXFDWHG¶DUHDVYRWHGWRUHPDLQ
In authorities with below average levels of education the Leave campaign received 58 percent 
of the vote but in authorities with above average levels of education it received 49 percent of 
the vote. 
Figure 1 Educational qualification and support for Leave 
  
However, we should also note that there is substantial variation around the µline of best fit¶As 
shown in Figure 1, there are a number of places where the Leave vote was lower than expected 
based on the average levels of education at the local authority level. These places tended to be 
in Scotland and London. If we exclude London and Scotland from our analysis the association 
between education and the Leave vote becomes far stronger. The R-square for no educational 
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excluding London. This indicates that outside of London and Scotland the country was highly 
polarized along educational lines on whether to support Brexit or not.  
Next we turn to age, which past studies have shown is positively related to supporting 
Brexit, with the late middle-aged and pensioners notably more likely to vote for Ukip and, prior 
to the actual referendum, voice support for leaving the EU. As above we find a clearly 
identifiable association between the age profile of an authority and the Leave vote, albeit 
somewhat weaker. Figure 2 shows the association between the percentage of people within a 
local authority aged 18-30 years old and the percentage who voted to leave, and the association 
between the percentage aged 65 years old and above, and the Leave vote. The vote to leave the 
EU tends to be lower in areas that have a large population of young people, many of which are 
university towns. Oxford and Cambridge are the two authorities that have the largest proportion 
of people aged 18 to 30 years old and both recorded a Remain vote in excess of 70 per cent. Of 
WKHµ\RXQJHVW¶DXWKRULW\DUHDV16 voted to Remain. By contrast the Leave vote was much 
stronger in authorities with a larger number of pensioners. Of the 20 µoldest¶ local authorities, 
19 voted to Leave. 




There is thus evidence that both the educational and age composition of different areas had an 
influence on the propensity of residents to vote leave, though the pattern in London and 
Scotland may have been somewhat different. We can get a clearer idea of the joint impact of 
these different factors by carrying out a multivariate regression analysis. Places where there 
are lots of young people might also be places where inhabitants have qualifications and are 
thus more highly educated. To what extent do both the age and educational composition of an 
area matter when we consider their impact on the Leave vote together? 
Table 2 presents results from a series of linear regression models. The dependent 
variable is the level of support for leaving the EU. From Model 1 we see that both education 
and age have a significant effect on the Leave vote. If anything, the effect of education on the 
Leave vote might have been slightly stronger than the effect of age (at least at the aggregate 
level). But even in places where there were similar levels of education, support for leaving the 






10 15 20 25 30






5 10 15 20 25 30
Age 65 plus (%)
15 
 
the education and age profiles of different areas the Leave vote was noticeably lower in London 
and Scotland than elsewhere. The results for Scotland are especially striking - the Leave vote 
was some 22 percentage points lower than might have been expected given the educational and 
age profile of the country. 
Table 2 Multivariate Analysis of Support for Leave - Linear Regression 
 
 Model 1:  
Demographics 








Model 3:  
Ethnic 
diversity 
Model 4:  
Ukip 










% Age 65 
and over 
0.30*** 0.09 0.23** 0.10 0.30** 0.11 0.19* 0.11 -0.33*** 0.68 
% no 
qualifications 
1.16*** 0.06 1.12*** 0.07 1.07*** 0.08 1.16*** 0.06 0.76*** 0.05 
% EU 
migrants 
  -0.36* 0.19 -0.61** 0.23   -0.34*** 0.12 
Change in 
EU migrants 
    0.51** 0.19     
% non-white       -0.07 0.04   
London -8.82*** 1.26 -7.34*** 1.48 -
6.28*** 





1.12   -
21.77*** 
1.15 -2.15* 1.11 
Ukip 2014 
EP vote 
        0.84*** 0.04 
Constant 23.94*** 2.09 27.11*** 2.68 26.33 2.99 26.41*** 2.61 18.34*** 1.78 
N 380  380  295  380  380  
Adjusted R-
square 
0.68  0.68  0.62  0.68  0.87  




The next factors that we consider relate to ethnic diversity and immigration, issues that 
dominated the referendum and are central to explaining support for Ukip.ix One of the central 
PHVVDJHVRIWKH/HDYHFDPSDLJQZDVWRµWDNHEDFNFRQWURORIRXUERUGHUV¶with the implicit 
assumption that this would help reduce migration into Britain. This message played on public 
concerns about immigration within the country, which surveys frequently reveal is the topic 
that the public think is the most important issue facing the country. But did the message have 
particular resonance in local communities where there were large numbers of migrants from 
other EU member states? 
Figure 3 Immigration and Public Support for Leave 
 
On the face of it, the answer to this question appears to be no. From Figure 3 we can see that 
there is in fact a negative relationship between the level of EU migration in an area and the 















that had the fewest recent immigrants from the EU that were the most likely to want to leave 
the EU. For example, South Staffordshire in the West midlands has one of the lowest levels of 
EU migration in the country, with less than 1 percent of the population born in mainland 
Europe. Yet in this authority area the Leave vote reached 78 percent. Of the 20 places with the 
fewest EU migrants 15 voted to leave the EU. By contrast, of the 20 places with the most EU 
migrants 18 voted to remain. In many of the areas that were among the most receptive to the 
Leave campaign there were hardly any EU migrants at all. 
 There is also a negative, albeit slightly weaker, relationship between the size of the 
nonwhite population in an area and support for leave (r = -0.33). Places with large non-white 
populations tended to be somewhat less likely to vote Leave. Many of these places were in 
London. Of the 20 places with the largest non-white population 17 were in London and 15 
voted to remain. It is tempting to draw the inference from this that ethnic minorities were more 
likely to vote remain. But this is not necessarily the case and we will not be able to answer this 
question until individual-level analyses are undertaken. It is also possible that white people 
living in ethnically mixed areas were more likely to vote remain than people living in 
predominantly white areas, perhaps because they had a more cosmopolitan outlook.   
18 
 
Returning to Table 2, in Models 2 and 3 we examine the impact of EU immigration and 
ethnic diversity on support for leave in conjunction with the other factors that we have already 
discussed. Because the level of EU migration and size of the nonwhite population in an area 
are highly correlated (r=0.71) we model the two variables separately. Controlling for the age 
and education profiles of different areas, and whether or not they are in London or Scotland, 
from Model 2a we can see that support for Leave was somewhat lower in places where there 
were many EU migrants than where there were relatively few.  
From this it might be tempting to assume that immigration played no part in delivering 
Brexit. However, a slightly different picture emerges if we also consider changes in the level 
of EU migration.xi 'DWDRQUHFHQWFKDQJHLVRQO\DYDLODEOHIRU(QJODQGDQG:DOHVVRZHGRQ¶W
include it in our main analysis, but the results from this subset of cases reveal some interesting 
patterns. Controlling for the effect of overall migration and the other variables in Model 2a 
(excluding Scotland), those places which experienced an increase in EU migration over the last 
10 years tended to be somewhat more likely to vote Leave (b=0.51; p=0.007). Thus, even 
though areas with relatively high levels of EU migration tended to be more pro-remain; those 
places which had experienced a sudden influx of EU migrants over the last 10 years tended to 
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be more pro-Leave. This finding is consistent with the view that it is sudden changes in 
population that are most likely to fuel concern about immigration.  
From Model 3 we can see that there is not much evidence that the size of the non-white 
population matters. Once we have factored into the equation whether or not the area is in 
London, it does not appear to make much difference how ethnically diverse it is. 
The results presented so far are consistent with past research on Ukip, which 
HPSKDVL]HV WKH SDUW\¶V DSSHDO among older, working-class, white voters who lack 
qualifications and skills. Thus, to a certain extent the factors that helped to explain rise of Nigel 
Farage and Ukip also help to explain why, at the 2016 referendum, the British voted for Brexit. 
This point comes out incredibly clearly in Figure 3, which considers the association between 
support for Ukip at the 2014 European Parliament elections and support for Brexit at the 2016 
referendum. The R-square is 0.73, indicating a very strong relationship. By and large, then, 
authorities that were the most likely to vote for Brexit were the same ones that had given Ukip 
its strongest support two years earlier.  




However, this clearly is not the whole story. Whereas the average level of support for Ukip 
across all authorities in 2014 was 29 per cent, the average level of support for Leave at the 
2016 referendum was 53 per cent. Thus, even if the relative difference between authorities was 
much the same they were all substantially more likely to vote Leave than they had been to vote 
Ukip in the past, to the tune of around 25 percentage points. This raises an intriguing question 
± how might we explain where the additional votes for Leave came from? 
Among closer observers of British politics it would not be a surprise to find that more 
economically left behind areas of the country, such as Boston, Castle Point and Thurrock, have 
the strongest support for Brexit. But what is surprising is that the level of this support was so 
much higher in these areas (and others) than it had been for Ukip in 2014. Many insurgent 
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grow they often tend to try and broaden their social appeal and attract the votes of new sections 
RIVRFLHW\,VWKLVZKDW8NLS¶Vpopulist Eurosceptic message achieved?  
We can begin to get some idea of where the extra votes for Brexit came from by 
inspecting the impact of age and education on the Leave vote, while controlling for past support 
for Ukip. The results are presented under Model 4 in Table 2. The first thing to notice is that 
when we control for Ukip support WKH PRGHO¶V ILW WR WKH GDWD GUDPDWLFDOO\ LPSURYHV 7KH
adjusted R-square increases to 0.87. This clearly brings home how close the structure of 
variation in support for Leave between different authorities maps on to past support for Ukip. 
Interestingly, we find that once we take into account past support for Ukip, the effect of some 
of the other variables on the vote change as well. We now have to be a little careful about how 
we interpret these variables as they now show us the partial effect on Leave, controlling for 
past support for Ukip. So, for example, we know that places with older populations are both 
more likely to have voted for Ukip in 2014 and more likely to have voted Leave in 2016. 
However, when we take into account past support for Ukip we see that the effect of age on 
support for Leave is negative. This implies that support for Leave in 2016 is slightly less 
polarized along age lines than support for Ukip was in 2014.xii  
22 
 
By contrast the coefficient for education is positive. This implies public support for 
Brexit is more polarized along education lines than support for Ukip was.xiii Places where 
people have few educational qualifications tend to be more likely to support Ukip. But places 
where Ukip is strong and people have few qualifications tend to be more likely to vote Leave 
than places where Ukip is equally strong but there are a smaller number of people with fewer 
qualifications. Thus, to a certain extent, the 2016 referendum result magnified class divisions 
within Britain that were already evident in earlier years, and which parties like Ukip had been 
actively cultivating. Controlling for Ukip also wipes out the effect of Scotland and London. 
One way then in which these places are distinctive from the rest of the UK is the low support 
that they had given to Eurosceptic parties in the past.  
 
Discussion: Implications of the Result 
In the conclusions of their book on %ULWDLQ¶VUHIHUHQGXPLQ1975 Butler and Kitzinger warned 
against an interpretation of the vote to stay in the European Community as a public outburst of 
enthusiasm for the broader EXURSHDQSURMHFWµ,WZDV¶WKH\QRWHGµXQHTXLYRFDOEXWLWZDVDOVR
XQHQWKXVLDVWLF6XSSRUWIRUPHPEHUVKLSZDVZLGHEXWLWGLGQRWUXQGHHS«,WGLGQRWUHVXOWLQ
DJLUGLQJRIWKHORLQVIRUDJUHDWQHZ(XURSHDQDGYHQWXUH¶xiv The clear lack of British public 
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enthusiasm for European integration would remain clearly visible for much of the next forty 
years and would eventually, in June 2016, culminate in a vote for Brexit. 
Our analysis of this vote has revealed how the 2016 referendum gave full expression to 
much deeper divides in Britain that cut across generational, educational and class lines. The 
public vote for Brexit was anchored predominantly, albeit not exclusively, in areas of the 
country that are filled with pensioners, low skilled and less well educated blue-collar workers 
and citizens who have been pushed to the margins not only by the economic transformation of 
the country over recent decades but also by the values that have come to dominate a more 
socially liberal media and political class. In this respect the vote for Brexit was delivered by 
WKHµOHIWEHKLQG¶- social groups that are united by a general sense of insecurity, pessimism and 
marginalization, who do not feel as though elites, whether in Brussels or Westminster, share 
their values, represent their interests and genuinely empathize with their intense angst about 
rapid social, economic and cultural change. Interestingly, our results also reveal how turnout 
in the heartlands of Brexit was often higher than average, indicating perhaps that it is citizens 
who have long felt excluded from the mainstream consensus who used the referendum to voice 
WKHLUGLVWLQFWLYHYLHZVQRWRQO\DERXW%ULWDLQ¶V(8PHPEHUVKLSEXWD wider array of perceived 
threats to their national identity, values and ways of life. 
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Yet clearly the left behind thesis cannot explain the entire Brexit vote. Even if support 
for EU membership is more polarized along education than support for Ukip ever was, the 
centre of gravity has shifted. This represents something of a puzzle. Public support for 
Euroscepticism has both widened and narrowed ± it is now more widespread across the 
country, but it is also more socially distinctive. One potential explanation for this is that the 
Leave campaign recruited support from across the Conservative spectrum, helping to widen its 
appeal; but disproportionately from the low skilled and less well educated blue-collar Labour 
supporters, making it more socially distinctive. We will know more when individual level data 
is released, which will allow closer examination of the flow of the vote since 2015. But in the 
shadow of the 2016 referendum stands one basic assertion that few would contest: Britain is 
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